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Abstract: Psychological eudaimonism (PE) is the view that we 
are constituted by a desire to avoid the harmful. This entails that 
coming to see a prospective or actual object of pursuit as harmful 
to us will unseat our positive evaluative belief about (and co-
instantiated desire for) that object (§I). There is more than one 
way that such an 'unseating' of desire may be caused on an 
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intellectualist picture (§II). This paper arbitrates between two 
readings of Socrates' 'attack on laziness' in the Meno, with the 
aim of constructing a model of moral education based on PE's 
implied moral psychology. In particular, we argue against the view 
that when we come to see – through prudential reasoning – that 
our blatant evaluative beliefs and desires disserve eudaimonism, 
we will no longer perceive their intentional objects as choice-
worthy. We suggest, instead, that it is by experiencing shame that 
we cease to see the intentional objects of our evaluative beliefs 
and desires as worthy of pursuit (§III). This form of 'hydraulic 
education' bypasses reason-responsiveness altogether. As such, it 
only allows for practical norms to be derived from the nature of 
agency indirectly, namely by enabling the use of discursive 
practical reasoning. 
 
 
PROLOGUE 
 
Moral education in the Meno consists in recovering the 
desires and evaluative beliefs that constitute us as 
psychological eudaimonists. 1   That is, it is a matter of 
empirically recollecting what our souls contain a priori. 
Recollection, on this unpacking, consists in recovering our 
standing desire for the good. The effect of this recovery 
reconstitutes our motivational economies so that they 
reflect our deep eudaimonist commitments.2  
                                                 
1 The dialogue tells us that having true beliefs can serve us just as 
well as having knowledge (96e-97c). The primary aim of moral 
education will be to give the agent true beliefs about the good. 
This should not, however, be thought to exhaust Socratic moral 
education.  
2 “Since the soul both is immortal and has been born many times, 
and has seen both what is here and what is in Hades, and in fact 
all things, there is nothing it has not learned. And so it is no 
matter for wonder that it is possible for the soul to recollect both 
about virtue and about other things, given that it knew them 
previously. For since all nature is akin and the soul has learned 
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On this view, we cannot endorse any desires that, upon 
recognition, propel us towards misery and wretchedness. 
Our innate eudaimonism has the power of veto over any 
desire discovered to be errant. The grounds upon which a 
desire is deemed errant consist in it being found to disserve 
the soul’s native eudaimonism. In being—as Meno is—
readily taken in by the apparent good-condition of the soul 
that pleasure brings about, we just as readily assume that 
pain connotes harm. Consistent with our eudaimonism, and 
the constraint this places on our rational desires, the latter 
is thus avoided, as a negative corollary of acting for the sake 
of the good. Meno assumes just these connections. As 
such, Socrates in his “music to the ears of weaklings” 
(81d5-e2) speech commences Meno’s moral education by 
exploiting the latter's first-order desire to avoid pain, 
perceived by Meno as an apparent harm, in order to drive 
him away from the temptations of the eristic argument. 
Indeed, on the eudaimonist picture, the pursuit of 
something so apt to harm is psychologically excluded. To 
“tie down” Meno’s moral progress, Socrates uses the slave-
boy demonstration to explicitly engender the benefits 
belying apparent harms. Altogether, this mints in Meno a 
new, or rather recollected, desire for inquiry, whereby the 
“background”3 for his questions is no longer an empirical 
disposition of intellectual torpor nor a “greed for 
answers”,4 but his now-recovered standing desire to learn. 
The ultimate goal of moral education, then, is the 
                                                                                      
everything, there is no reason why someone who has recollected 
only one thing – which is what people call ‘learning’ – should not 
discover everything else, as long as one is brave and does not give 
up on the search. For seeking and learning turn out to be wholly 
recollection” (Men. 81c5-d4). 
3 Klein (1965), p.188-189. 
4 Giblin (1953), p.201. 
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satisfaction of the desire to live well, consisting in the 
pursuit and attainment of objects 5  that are objectively 
good.6 This paper asks how this is achieved in the particular 
case of Meno, with the further aim of clarifying the limited 
role that practical norms can play in hydraulic education. 
 
 
I. PSYCHOLOGICAL EUDAIMONISM AND SOCRATIC 
INTELLECTUALISM 
 
It is a foundation of Socratic ethics that every human 
soul is equipped with a native striving for the good.7 If this 
good can become the non-accidental8 object of our positive 
                                                 
5 Santas (1964), p.152 n.15. According to Annas (1981) p.181, 
rational desire “is associated with what is objective […] based on 
what can be judged to be the case after reflection”. According to 
Scott (1999), p.29 desires are rational if they are “founded upon 
beliefs about the good”.  
6 According to PE all of our desires may be parsed as desires to 
live well. For this reason, they may be couched as rational desires, 
that is, desires we have in virtue of being practically rational, sc. 
ones regulated by our conception of living well (eudaimonia). The 
intended objects of this comprehensive desire to live well are the 
de dicto good, understood as the beneficial (Men. 87e2-3), where 
attaining the beneficial is the mark of the eudaimon (as a negative 
corollary of the claim, at Men. 78a1-5, that attaining the harmful is 
the mark of the kakodaimon). As such, nobody rationally desires 
(or Socratically “wants”) the bad. If one desires the bad de re, but 
under the description ‘good’ or ‘beneficial’, one’s desires are still 
parsable as rational just in case these desires are regulated by 
one’s conception (however mistaken) of the good, for whose sake 
all of those actions are taken.   
7 Segvic, (2000), p.20. 
8 As we see it, the “de re / de dicto” distinction, applicable to 
Socrates’ discussion of desire at Men. 77b-78b, does not 
disambiguate sufficiently. For everything one actually desires 
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evaluative beliefs and desires, that is, the object that has 
“the required evaluative properties and the agent recognises, 
and responds to, these properties”,9 then we will live well. All 
human actions, according to this model, must be parsed as 
aiming at the good de dicto. Indeed, according to Socratic 
ethics, human actions are structured teleologically: 
everything an agent does is for the sake of the good. 10 
Clearly, however, while the soul moves in this teleological 
direction, the objects picked out by the description ‘good’ 
could, and do, fall short of evaluative reality. That is, as 
Wolfsdorf puts it, “all people desire objects as a result of 
fallibly evaluating them as good”. 11  Before discussing the 
intended and actual objects of desire according to the Meno, 
we shall first briefly unpack how Socrates’ cognitivist 
approach to desire relates to evaluative belief.  
                                                                                      
could happen to be good, and this is compatible with both moral 
luck and recognition of a real evaluative property. 
9 Segvic (2000), p.10 (our emphasis).  
10  According to Socratic moral psychology, in apprehending a 
moral reason, we obtain sufficient motivation for its pursuit. 
Mackie (1977, p.24) expresses Socrates’ intellectualism very 
nicely: “Being acquainted with the [Form] of the Good […] [one] 
will, by this knowledge alone, without any further motivation, be 
impelled to pursue and promote these ideals.” Nehamas (1998, 
p.28) also phrases the position well: “Socrates' ethical 
intellectualism makes him believe that once people acquire 
knowledge of virtue, they will be able to tell what the good thing 
to do is in all circumstances, and will in fact do it.” When Plato 
uses the term “reason” in relation to action (e.g. ‘aition’ at 
Protagoras 352d), he has a teleological conception of reason in 
mind. We might then distinguish between normative teleological 
reasons, for the sake of which we ought to act; and so-called 
'motivating' teleological reasons, for the sake of which we actually act. 
11 Wolfsdorf (2006) p.51. Our emphasis. 
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On our reading of Socratic intellectualism, human 
desires are psychologically bound up with evaluative beliefs. 
Just in case one believes an object to be good, one desires 
it.12 As such, a positive evaluative belief about some object 
necessitates one's desire for that object. Pari passu, a desire 
for some object always involves that one holds a positive 
evaluative belief about it: if you pursued some object it is 
because you thought it good. Owing to this, on the Socratic 
picture it is possible to read off from your actions which 
evaluative beliefs and desires you held. 13  On this view, 
desires are not merely concomitants of our evaluative 
beliefs, but are co-instantiated with them. This co-
instantiation entails that an object is desired under any 
description that renders it true that the agent believes the 
object in question to be good. Likewise, an agent believes 
an object to be good under any description whereby it is 
desired. Thus, a propositional attitude of the kind “I think 
cream buns are great” implies a desiderative pro-attitude 
towards cream buns (in Barney’s helpful phrase, an 
“appropriative attitude”).14 Any such appropriative attitude, 
                                                 
12 As Segvic explains: “Socratic volition is a receptivity of the soul 
to certain evaluative properties of the object of volition, the 
properties Socrates designates by the term “good”. However, 
wanting (boulesis) is not sheer receptivity; it is mediated by a 
correct conception of the object of desire as the good or the right 
thing to do. […] so Socratic volition latches onto a certain 
evaluative aspect of reality. Thus this kind of wanting can be 
correctly ascribed to the agent only if the object of his volition 
has the required evaluative properties and the agent recognises, 
and responds to, just these properties. […] desire (epithumia) 
involves believing that the object of desire is good, wanting 
(boulesis) implies knowing that the object of desire is good.” 
13  For a contemporary development of this view, see Nagel 
(1970) ch. 5. 
14 Barney (2010, p.40). 
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originating in a belief about the object’s goodness, will 
produce sufficient motivation to act upon the desire that is 
co-instantiated with the evaluative belief. This view is 
known as strong motivational internalism. It can be stated 
as follows:  
 
Knowing or believing the good, given the 
actual or apparent perception of a moral 
property, necessarily exerts a motivational pull 
on the agent acquainted with that moral 
property.15  
 
Altogether, the above implies that the evaluative beliefs 
one has delimits the desires one can act upon. Only this 
picture of the relation between desire and evaluative belief 
can make sense of the Protagoras’s (351b) denial of akrasia. 
In that text, being “overcome by pleasure” (ὑπὸ τῶν 
ἡττᾶσθαι), in cases where you alleged to believe or know of 
a better course of action, is ruled out. If you have been 
overcome by pleasure or irrational desire for some object 
other than what you purportedly believed or knew to be 
best, it turns out that you did not in fact believe or know 
the original course of action was best. If you really did 
believe it to be best, then you could not have ended up 
doing otherwise. That you desired to X while believing that 
doing Y is better reveals that your positive evaluative beliefs 
and concomitant desires are in actual fact set over objects 
of kind X, rather than objects of kind Y.   
Such cognitivism about desire asserts that we cannot 
desire objects under the description ‘bad’. Since cognitive 
attitudes are prior16 to (yet, from the perspective of agency, 
                                                 
15 This statement, closely echoing Mackie, follows Olson (2014), 
p.111. 
16 Ibid., p.38. 
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inextricable from) desiderative attitudes, thinking an object 
bad prevents our being motivated to pursue that object. 
However, as Bobonich explains, since “the principle of 
psychological eudaimonism […] does not immediately 
entail that the person have any particular conscious 
attitudes”,17 while the intended object of all our desires is the 
good, the actual objects of our desires could be bad. 18 
Nonetheless, we desire them sub specie boni, as apparent 
goods. As Barney explains on this point, “‘apparent goods’ 
aren’t some natural kind that we might prefer to real ones, 
but are just the class of things thought to be genuinely 
so”.19 As such, Socrates’ claim that “we all desire the good” 
is most naturally understood as a de dicto claim. But it could 
also be seen to amount to the de re claim, viz. that “we all 
want to do the thing that is actually right and good”, 
regardless of how we conceive of it. That is, as Barney puts 
it, ‘good’ is the “perspicuous” description of the object of 
our desires,20  even if, as Carone notes, we do not have 
“opaque acquaintance with the objects of [our] desires”,21 
viz. by not being “fully aware of the content of 
happiness”.22 In other words, one desires to do whatever 
actually fits the description ‘what is good in evaluative reality’. 
We can helpfully think of this along Biblical lines. Imagine 
someone imploring God: “Show me what is right! I want to 
do it, but I do not know what it is…Lord guide me!” In 
this ‘de re theological’ sense one desires the good insofar as 
one desires whatever fits the bill of the good in actuality, and this 
                                                 
17 Bobonich (2010), p.297 n.10.  
18 Scott (2005), p.49. 
19 Barney (2010), p.35. 
20 Ibid., p.53. 
21 Carone (2004), p.67. 
22 Ibid. 
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is compatible with not knowing what it is. Put more 
succinctly: one desires whichever thing (res) merits the 
description (de dicto) ‘good’. Even if one has a false 
conception of the good, then, there are at least two senses 
in which one both desires the good and desires the bad (see 
n.38 for elaboration).  
One can desire some bad thing de re, whereby one’s 
desires track or are in fact set over some evaluatively poor 
object, provided it is desired under the guise of the good, 
and provided this guise is not removed or altered. This 
strikes us as Socrates’ takeaway claim in the Meno’s central 
discussion on the objects of desires (77b2-78b6). Were an 
object to be revealed as fitting a description under which it 
is not desired (indeed, where it could not be desired as a 
negative corollary of the thesis of PE), the agent would give 
up the desire on account of now taking its object to be 
bad.23 This is not only true as a psychological fact. It also 
logically precludes the ascription of such a desire to the agent 
for the object revealed to be harmful. For example, when 
the object desired under the description ‘good’ is revealed 
to the agent to instead fit the description ‘harmful’, since 
this reveals that the desired object is bad, and moreover 
given the equivalence of the bad, the harmful, and the 
wretched-conducing (since, according to PE, nobody 
desires to be wretched), it cannot be true that they desire 
the bad and harmful object. PE precludes the ascription of 
the (presumably second-order) desire to be wretched, and 
this falsifies the claim that the agent desires the 
                                                 
23  As Kamtekar (2006) p.145 writes, “our beliefs (or their 
expression in particular circumstances) are typically governed by 
rules of consistency and logical entailment, and we may be unaware 
of the bearing of these rules on our beliefs – which ones conflict with 
one another, and which ones we will abandon when we find they 
conflict, and so on.”  
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(equivalently) bad/harmful object.24 In other words, if an 
evaluatively bad property, coextensive with the object of 
one’s desire, were to become perspicuous to one, one 
would no longer even desire (in the general sense of 
‘epithumein’) it, because one cannot desire (either epithumein 
or boulesthai) something qua bad.25 In cases such as these, if 
we remove or alter the guise (that is, the de dicto description) 
under which it is true that the agent desires the 
desideratum, since this does not preserve the intensionality 
of the attitude ‘desiring’, neither does it preserve the truth 
of the claim—or, to use Davidson’s expression, “the 
validity of the inference”—that the agent desires the object 
de re.26  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 PE's plausibility depends on understanding the desire to not be 
wretched as being second-order (Frankfurt: 1971, p.12), de dicto 
(Davidson 1985, p.297), thick (Raz 1999, pp.101-110), and 'super' 
(Frankish 2004, pp.xiiff). Whether Socrates' argument for PE 
loses any of its bite once we conceive the desire in question this 
way (as opposed to one that is first-order, de re, thin, and/or 
'basic') is beyond the scope of this paper; but we are not 
optimistic. 
25  Socratic wanting (boulesthai) is, we might say, evaluatively 
factive: it does not count as wanting (boulesthai) if the object the 
desire is set over is not really good. As Devereux (1995), p.402 
puts it: “For Socrates, the distinction between wish and desire is 
parallel to the distinction between knowledge and opinion—just 
as we do not speak of someone knowing x unless x is true, so we 
should not speak of someone wishing for x unless x is truly good. 
[…] Wish (boulesthai) is veridical in relation to its objects whereas 
desire (epithumein) is not [necessarily].”  
26 Davidson (1985), pp.295ff. 
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II. FORMING AND UNSEATING DESIRE IN THE MENO  
 
The above gives us clues as to how the unseating and 
formation of desires may occur within the Meno’s moral 
psychology, including how Meno’s own desires may come 
and go. As we shall see in due course, this will prove to be 
of central importance.  
Let us begin with unseating. Revealing an object to fit a 
description whereby it could not possibly, on reflection, be 
desired (for example, since it is constitutive of us to avoid 
such objects) can unseat the desire for that object. Does 
this mean that it is consciousness of an entailment that 
removes the desire (an empirical claim), or is it just the very 
fact that such an entailment is present (an a 
priori/conceptual claim) that makes the desire impossible? 
Clearly, desiring the bad de re is a real possibility.27 What is 
impossible is to desire the bad de re once the only set of 
descriptors under which it could only have been desired (viz. 
qua good, beneficial, or happiness-conducing) have been 
substituted for their contrapositives (viz. qua bad, harmful, 
or wretchedness-conducing). Importantly, this substitution 
cannot go unnoticed by the desiring agent. Since desiring 
something under one of the latter descriptors implies 
desiring something that one believes will make them 
miserable (athlios), and nobody according to PE desires that, 
then it is impossible to continue to desire a bad object de re 
once the object of that desiderative attitude is revealed 
perspicuously to the agent to be an object of universal 
human avoidance (77e5–78b2). Thus, revealing the 
desideratum under the description whereby it is the object 
of avoidance (viz. the harmful), will remove the desire.  
                                                 
27 At least when we understand this to mean, as Reshotko (2006), 
p.147 writes: “All people either desire good things or desire bad 
things thinking them good”. 
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The above also gives us a clue as to how the formation of 
desire may occur according to the Meno’s moral 
psychology.28 The text allows us to posit two ways in which 
desires can be formed. The first imports the prudentialism 
of the Protagoras. On this reading, if desiring something 
requires perceiving an object as beneficial, then if an object 
can be calculated to benefit—following, for example (and as 
we elaborate below), the Protagoras’s recommendation of the 
“measuring art”—then this will cause a desire for that 
object.  
The second, more ‘passive’ picture of desire 
formation—though still compatible with the intellectualist 
moral psychology of 77b-78b—is as follows. If some 
object’s beneficial properties can be made explicit to us, 
such that we take (sc. think, believe) the object’s pursuit 
and acquisition to be beneficial for us, we will form desires 
to pursue and appropriate the apparently beneficial object. 
The appearance of benefit can be achieved through the 
experience of pleasure, an apparent good. This is because 
experiencing pleasure is one way of appearing to be 
benefitted, since pleasure brings about the apparent good-
condition (euexia) of the soul—a signal to us that our 
standing eudaimonist desires are being satisfied, though this 
is of course compatible with ethical hubris. On this model, 
                                                 
28 What causes us to evaluate objects as good? The objects of 
one’s first-order desires are all, as we conceive of them at least, 
on this picture of PE, means to happiness. To the person who has 
not accurately specified what happiness consists in, e.g. Meno, 
these could even appear to be the constituents of happiness. We are 
apt to see the immediate "appropriative" objects of our first-
order desires as valuable on account of the experiential benefits 
they afford. Chief amongst these are pleasure and satisfaction. 
Thus, these objects appear choice-worthy because, on account of 
their capacity to please and satisfy, they thereby appear to satisfy 
the standing desire for our own welfare. Cf. Taylor (2008), p.226 
ff. 
 Louise Rebecca Chapman & Constantine Sandis 13 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2018. 
if some option can be presented to us as beneficial by giving 
us pleasure (even in the mere imagination of that option), 
we will want to pursue that option because we see it as 
giving us what we value: happiness. (The same is true, 
mutatis mutandis, of pain. Having some desiderative option 
presented painfully, then, will prevent or forestall the 
formation of a desire for the object being presented.)  
Unless the experience of pain can be cognitively mediated 
with the evidence of benefit (thus enabling the subject to 
forge a reflective, cognitive connexion between pain and 
benefit), the only connotation pain will have for a subject is 
that of producing wretchedness rather than happiness. We 
return to this latter point in our discussion of the slave-boy 
demonstration.  
But how is this second mode of desire formation and 
unseating compatible with Socratic intellectualism, which 
reduces all motivation to the cognitive? Our answer is that 
to the extent that experiencing pleasures entails that one 
thereby believes oneself is benefitted, pleasure is inextricably 
bound up with the cognitive (if one did not believe one was 
benefitted, there would be no experience of pleasure). 
Moreover, in experiencing pleasure one takes oneself to be 
acting in ways consistent with PE, even if one’s experience 
of pleasure is not explicitly regulated by the norms 
generated by PE. As Carone notes, experiencing pleasure 
causes an agent “to believe that he is in a state of euexia”.29 
These pleasures are of a piece with rational desires. Since 
one pursues these pleasures and desires just because they are 
regulated by one’s conception of the good, they may be 
called rational desires; desires an agent has only in virtue of 
believing that the pursued object contributes to their overall 
happiness.30  
                                                 
29 Carone (2004), p.65 n.26. Our emphasis. 
30 According to Le Bar and Goldberg (2012), p.312, a desire is 
rational when we can "embed that desire within a framework of 
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Despite its intellectualism, then, the Meno provides us 
with two surprisingly diverse models by which empirical 
desires can be formed and unseated. In summary, the first 
requires that we calculate whether the option in front of us 
is really beneficial. Ceasing to see something as beneficial 
after engaging in the art of measurement will extirpate the 
desire for that object, while discovering that an option is 
most beneficial will cause a desire for that object. On the 
second model, if one’s desiderative options can in their very 
presentation to, or imagination by, the agent be experienced 
pleasantly or painfully, these can respectively form or 
unseat a desire for the desideratum. This is because the 
experience of pleasure is an apparent good connoting 
(albeit fallibly) the good-condition (euexia) of the soul. As 
such, the experience of such a pleasure subjectively feels 
like satisfying a rational desire for the (objective) good 
aimed at by one’s standing eudaimonist commitments. 
Indeed, from the perspective of the subject this is just what 
she is doing. This is true, mutatis mutandis, with pain, the 
experience of which connotes (again, fallibly) the bad-
condition of the soul, such that its experience feels like 
fulfilling a desire contrary to one’s eudaimonist desire for the 
good. Both the experience of pleasure and pain on this 
second model are regulated by one’s rational desire—that 
is, parasitic upon one’s conception—of the good.  
To foreground and pre-empt our discussion in §II, we 
want to briefly outline the role we think shame can play 
according to the second model, sketched above, of desire 
formation and unseating. Socratic attempts to unseat his 
interlocutors’ desires, in order to rearrange their 
                                                                                      
ends which takes it structure from the aim of living well, 
requiring the dominant desire to live well as part of one's 
psychological economy". See also Bobonich (2010), p.313: “a 
person desires and pursues anything only insofar as it conduces 
to his own greatest happiness”. 
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psychological economies—such that these interlocutors 
may lead better lives—foregrounds the role of shame. This 
motif is particularly prevalent in the Gorgias, but we want to 
suggest in this paper that it also operates in the Meno. Not 
only—as has been noted by previous scholars31—in the 
slave-boy demonstration, but earlier in Socrates’ “music to 
the ears of weaklings” tirade (81d5-e2), which attempts to 
persuade Meno out of his lazy desire (though not, on this 
picture, irrational) to abandon the inquiry into virtue. Being 
shamed on account of one’s evaluative beliefs has the 
power to unseat those evaluative beliefs and their co-
instantiated desires, because shame is experienced as a pain. 
This is significant, as Moss notes, because “shame can 
separate a person’s judgements about what is pleasant from 
his judgements about what is good”.32 If one thinks some 
object is good because its acquisition brings one great 
pleasure, being shamed on account of that evaluative 
belief—a painful experience—will cause one to feel pain 
instead of pleasure with regard to the desideratum. This 
causes one to see the desideratum anew: as something that 
does not bring about the good-condition (apparent or 
otherwise) of the soul, but the reverse. As a result of this, 
one no longer sees the desideratum as an object of rational 
desire, because, in Scott’s words, “a person desires 
something if and only if they believe that it contributes to 
their overall happiness”. 33  If apparent pleasures were 
rationally desired given the belief that they contribute to 
one’s happiness, then the agent will register actual pains as 
signs that the desideratum is not ‘happiness-conducing’ 
(along with the other descriptors belonging to this triad) 
                                                 
31  See for example: Gordon (1999); Weiss (2001, p.82); Scott 
(2005, p.209); Brickhouse and Smith (2010), p.117. 
32 Moss (2005, p.140). 
33 Scott (2005, p.51). Our emphases. 
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after all. The agent will simultaneously give up the 
evaluative belief that such an object is good, and, with that, 
the desire for the object as contributing to their good will 
also disappear.  
The removal of errant desires, along these lines, 
removes obstacles to living well. On certain interpretations, 
in fact, this removal is all it takes to reconstitute the 
motivational topography of agents to that of the “true 
self”. 34  (Recall that, for example, in Republic X (611b9-
612a3), Plato employs an image of the sea-god Glaucus as 
an analogy of an “unencrusted soul”, to use Raphael 
Woolf’s phrase,35 whose true nature is philosophical but is 
hindered in reflecting this disposition given its association 
with the empirical “accretions” 36  it has acquired in its 
maritime situation.) The removal of such cognitive 
obstacles, such as errant beliefs about the good and their 
desiderative entailments, suffices for us to recover, or 
recollect, our standing desire for the good. We return to 
this discussion in our exegesis of 81d5-e2 (§III).  
Let us return now to the equivalence within the 
respective and exclusionary evaluative triads 
good/beneficial/happiness-conducing and 
bad/harmful/wretchedness-conducing. If one’s 
desideratum is shown to an agent (and she notices it) to fit 
the description of any single descriptor in the respective 
triad, this will make it true that it is desired qua any of the 
other descriptors belonging to the same triad. However, 
since nothing is desired under the descriptors of the latter 
triad, if one’s desideratum is revealed under one of these 
descriptions, on pain of the truth of PE, the desire for the 
                                                 
34 See especially Cornford (1933, p.306). See also Brickhouse and 
Smith (1996, ch. 3, esp. p.101). 
35 See Woolf (2012). 
36 Ibid., p.158. 
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thing itself (the res) will be eliminated. If de dicto descriptions 
are interchangeable just insofar as there is an identity 
relation between those descriptions, falsifying one’s desire 
for just one of these equivalent de dicto descriptions (e.g., if 
not beneficial, then not good), can serve to unseat the 
desire de re. This means that making transparent the 
equivalence/identity of these de dicto descriptions places 
descriptive constraints on the possible objects of our de dicto 
desires. Indeed, as a consequence of this, it will now be 
false that you want to appropriate the thing that has now 
been revealed to fit the description ‘harmful’. For, as 
Wolfsdorf explains, “an intensional context is one in which 
substitution of coextensive expressions does not preserve 
truth-values”.37  
To illustrate the above, and adapting one of Wolfsdorf’s 
own examples, consider the following sentence describing a 
case of ignorant incest: “Jane desires to have sex with 
Joseph; Joseph is Jane’s brother; therefore, Jane desires to 
have sex with her brother.” Desire introduces an 
intensional context. Owing to this, we cannot replace co-
referring terms (e.g., “brother” for “Joseph”) and preserve 
the sentence’s truth-value. 38  In these cases we speak of 
desire de dicto: Jane de dicto desires to sleep with Joseph, but 
she does not de dicto desire to sleep with her brother. 
However, since ‘Joseph’ picks out the same thing as ‘Jane’s 
brother’, it is true de re that Jane desires to sleep with her 
brother.39 To adapt a quotation from Broackes:  
 
A [desire-ascription] is about a particular 
object (de that particular re) if one is free to 
                                                 
37 Wolfsdorf (2006, p.34 n. 20). 
38 Broackes (1986, p.375).  
39 See, again, Davidson (1985), esp. pp.296-297. 
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substitute any name or description of that 
object.40  
 
Owing to this, we should heed Scott’s recommendation 
that, “when it comes to deciding whether the people under 
discussion desire the good or not, we should focus on their 
intended objects”.41 
Recall that PE holds that desire for the good “belongs 
to our common nature” (Men. 78b6-7).42 This is equivalent 
to the claim that “no one does evil knowing that it is evil”. 
If you have beliefs about the good, or better yet knowledge, 
you will never act against these beliefs, provided the belief 
is held at the time of acting.43 As noted above, this places 
descriptive constraints on the possible objects of our de dicto 
desires as psychological eudaimonists. The above, however, 
also places a normative constraint on us as desiring agents. 
Indeed, PE can be found to generate the following 
prescriptive claim. Following Le Bar and Goldberg, we call 
this thesis, ‘normative eudaimonism’:  
 
We have conclusive reason to act in ways that 
conduce to our own eudaimonia.44  
 
                                                 
40 Broackes (1986), p.375. 
41 Scott (2005), p.49. 
42 PE appears widely across the Platonic corpus: Euthy. 278e3-5, 
Prot. 358c6-d4, Grg. 467e6-468c7, Meno 78a3, Rep. 505e1-2, Sym. 
205a4-10, and Phile. 20d6-8. 
43 The amounts to the impossibility of both ‘synchronic belief-
akrasia’ and ‘diachronic knowledge-akrasia’. (On this, see Penner 
1996, p.201). 
44 Le Bar and Goldberg (2012), p.288. 
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According to this claim, certain norms preside over all 
acts that are within our control. This, very importantly, 
includes cognitive acts such as those involved in the 
formation of our evaluative beliefs. Since we pursue objects 
sub specie boni, that is, those that seem best to one even when 
the acquisition of those objects is not really in our 
eudaimonist interests, we ought, as Brickhouse and Smith 
note, to subject these seemings to “sensible evaluation”.45 If 
we can correct our errors—or, just as importantly, our 
errors can be corrected—at the level of evaluative belief, 
then we can end up with desires at the first-order that 
conduce to, and satisfy, our standing desire for happiness. If 
not, then we run the risk of “ethical hubris”:46 whereby we 
think we are living well when we are not.47   
The problem here is one of motivation. This is because, 
on the Socratic-intellectualist picture, our beliefs about 
living well end up constituting, and thereby delimiting, the 
motives from which we can act. As such, we can follow 
Mackie and describe Socratic intellectualism as entailing 
“motivational internalism”, 48  or, following Stratton-Lake 
“belief internalism”.49 As Rider rightly presses,  
 
                                                 
45 Brickhouse and Smith (2010), p.46. 
46 Reeve (1989), p.35. 
47 As Segvic (2000), p.16 notes, “the Greek verb translated as ‘to 
err’, ‘ἐξαμαρτάνειν’ or ‘ἁμαρτάνειν’ (Prot. 345d6-e4), ranges over a 
wide territory. It covers both simply going wrong, in the sense of 
making an error [and] doing wrong, in a moral sense.” 
48 Mackie (1977), pp.23-4. 
49 According to Stratton-Lake (1999), p.313: "if A believes that 
she ought to Φ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated 
to Φ in C, or she is irrational." As Evans (2010), p.17 n.44 puts it 
(as it applies distinctively in the Meno): “if an agent desires x, then 
she believes that x is good for her”. 
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If Socrates is right about the structure of 
human motivation, nothing is more important 
in a person’s life than that he have the right 
views about what is valuable.50  
 
Owing to Socratic eudaimonism, then, we are, as Le Bar 
and Goldberg put it, under “reflective pressures to shape 
our empirical desires according to the end of living well”.51 
If we inevitably desire and pursue what we think good, then 
by either calculating what is good, or being persuaded that 
something is good so that we end up taking it to be good, 
will motivate the pursuit and acquisition of that thing. This 
is why, as Wolfsdorf explains, “Socrates is concerned with 
evaluations of objects that motivate the acquisition of those 
objects”.52  Thus, when we reflect on and discover what 
living well consists in, we will desire whatever we find to be 
instrumental to the fulfilment of that desire.53 Pari passu, as 
Irwin identifies, if an agent “ceases to believe that x 
contributes to the final good, he will cease to want x”.54 
Indeed, Socrates’ mention of kakodaimonia at the end of his 
argument (Meno 78a2) itself has the effect of reminding us 
of what we really want: eudaimonia. In light of prompting 
this recollection, Klein writes, for us and for Meno:  
 
Everything would have to be considered anew 
[…] We would have to decide about the 
“rightness”, or right order, of [our] goals 
                                                 
50 Rider (2007), p.43. 
51 Le Bar and Goldberg, (2012), p.307. 
52 Wolfsdorf (2006), p.91. 
53 Le Bar and Goldberg (2012), p.293. 
54 Irwin (1977), p.78. 
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[when] most of the time we shy away from 
this all-important task.55  
 
If our tendency to form beliefs ignores the norms 
available to govern this activity, 56  as per normative 
eudaimonism, such as when we “guess at pleasure without 
the best” (Grg. 465a), our evaluative beliefs—which 
motivate us to pursue what we take to be the good—will 
also fail to represent evaluative reality correctly, and so we 
will fail to do what we want as eudaimonists. Thus, if we 
can control (or, indeed, if Socrates can control) what 
happens during our evaluation of our desiderative options, 
so that we evaluate aright, then we can be motivated to 
pursue and thereby attain the right objects. In so doing we 
would fulfil the desires constitutive of us as psychological 
eudaimonists. In short, we would live well. In the next 
section we begin discussing the first model that might be at 
work in the Meno regarding how Meno himself can 
evaluative his options aright.  
 
 
III. CHANGING MENO'S MIND 
 
One way of controlling how we evaluate our 
desiderative options is by using prudential reasoning. One 
form of prudential reasoning that can “show us the truth” 
(δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς) (Prt. 356d8-e2) is the “art of 
                                                 
55 Klein (1965), p.77. But is the giving up of a desire always this 
reflective? While in certain Socratic dialogues the formation of 
desire is presented as result from calculative reflective (such as in 
the Protagoras), we claim that it is not always as explicitly reflective 
as this. Those who are out of practice with such reflective skills 
(as we think Meno is) may give up their desires following a more 
passive methodology, as suggested in §II.  
56 On this topic, see Vogt (2012), esp. pp.19-20. 
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measurement” (ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη) (356d), which is touted 
in the Protagoras to be our “salvation” (σωτηρία) (356e2–4). 
Are these the kinds of tools Meno takes recourse to when 
Socrates suggests that he should reconsider and re-evaluate 
the merits of the eristic argument? Given Meno’s 
acceptance of PE in the key passage on desire at 78a5-6, the 
only way to understand Meno’s choices are as expressions of 
his practical rationality, viz. as concerted, rational attempts 
to satisfy the desire to live well. However, while Meno may 
have exhibited tendencies to “guess at pleasure without the 
best” (Grg. 465a), this is, from the perspective of PE, 
prudentially irrational (though not in fact irrational, given 
that Meno’s desire for pleasure is still desired qua 
contributing toward the good, such that Meno’s own 
behaviour can be read subjectively as prudentially rational). In 
this section, we explore this possibility by reading into the 
key passage (Men. 81d5-e2) the psychology of the Protagoras.  
          Socrates’ denouncement of the eristic 
argument—whose immediate, and presumably intended, 
result is to stall the pair’s inquiry into virtue—goes as 
follows: 
 
We ought not then to be led astray by the 
contentious argument you quoted. It would 
make us lazy and is music to the ears of 
weaklings. The other doctrine produces 
energetic seekers after knowledge; and being 
convinced of its truth, I am ready, with your 
help, to inquire into the nature of virtue. 
(81d5-e2)57 
 
In order to determine whether Meno’s choices, and 
therefore his progress, are directed by the norms governing 
prudential rationality in his eventual abandonment of the 
                                                 
57 Translation by Guthrie (1956), slightly adapted. 
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eristic argument, we should first consider what we know 
about Meno’s character thus far in the text.  
Meno has demonstrated a proclivity, up until this point 
in the dialogue, to prefer the lazy way out. For this is the 
path of least resistance, and that way immediate pleasures 
lie. Meno, we have learned thus far, is highly sensitized to 
the pleasures of confirmation. Consider, first, how Meno 
relays his experience of aporia, intellectual numbness, as like 
being stung by the torpedo fish (79e7–80b7). That numbness, 
nay analgesia, can have the effect of such a pain on Meno 
proves just how sensitive he is to the pleasures of 
confirmation (and the pains of being confounded). 58 
Consider also that the definition Meno gives of colour is 
one he is “used to” and thereby “pleases [him] more” 
(ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον) than the previously-given definition of 
shape. When Meno can indulge his tendency for being 
philosophically work-shy, he does—he even, at one point, 
demands it (76a8–c3). Indeed, Meno says explicitly that he 
will stay (περιμένοιμ᾽) in the conversation if Socrates 
continues to gratify him with answers of a certain kind 
(77a1-2). Meno essentially banks on the pleasure of being 
reassured that Gorgias’s gobbets—the tutor from whom 
Meno memorises speeches and answers59—hold up under 
scrutiny, and is upset when this expectation is subverted. 
All of this points to, as Scott notes, a tyrannical soul:60 one 
who takes pleasure to be the good, and who behaves so as 
to sustain that psychic status quo.  
While Meno’s intellectual laziness promises short-term 
pleasures, heeding the norms of evaluative belief-formation 
is the route to guaranteeing that one’s life is well lived. The 
                                                 
58 Warren (2014), p.28. 
59 As Weiss (2001), p.19 notes, “Meno's very name is, in fact, a 
pun on memory and memorization.” 
60 Scott (2005), p.63. 
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Meno recommends that we heed the norms of evaluative 
belief-formation to prevent us from succumbing to the 
ready comforts of intellectual laziness, for that way 
kakodaimonia lies. Contenting oneself with mere 
appearances whilst eschewing the norms of belief-
formation thereby constitutes a kind of flattery that the 
Gorgias denounces as “[guessing] at what's pleasant with no 
consideration for what's best” (Grg. 465a1-2).  
With such an interest in pleasure, then, Meno would do 
well to engage in the kind of prudential reasoning that aims 
at maximising his hedonic benefits. Does Meno plausibly 
engage in such an attempt at pleasure’s maximisation at the 
crossroads between the eristic argument and the doctrine of 
recollection? Let us see. 
 According to the first reading, the moral wrong that 
constitutes succumbing to the eristic argument is a matter 
of errant prudential reasoning. As James Warren explains:  
 
 The principal aim of the art of measurement is 
to produce an accurate account of something's 
size or value which is not distorted by factors 
that are irrelevant [such as] the physical 
proximity of the object.61 
 
According to the picture of the Protagoras, our lives go 
best overall when we engage in cognition by which we 
maximise the pleasures accruing to us. We can call this view 
“prudentialism”.62  Would this make Meno’s longstanding 
tendency to “guess at what's pleasant with no consideration 
for what's best” (Grg. 465a1-2) merely a matter of faulty 
prudential reasoning? Yes. We know that Meno has 
systematically avoided engaging in the art of measurement, 
                                                 
61 Warren (2014), p.104. 
62 Brickhouse and Smith (2010), pp.44-49. 
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failing, thereby, to calculate what is really in his interest 
rather than what appears to be given the proximity, and so 
illusory size, of pleasures accruing to him. The pursuit of 
pleasure qua good, then, is susceptible to calculation, for 
forcible reflection on the benefits or harms accrued by 
these pleasures can diminish or remove their good-
appearance and hence their desirability.63 Thus, by forcing 
Meno to adjudicate his options in terms of a cost-benefit 
analysis, employing the art of measurement (should he 
assent to the eristic argument, or assent to the doctrine of 
recollection?), cancels (ἄκυρον) (Prt. 356d7-8) the effect of 
appearances on Meno’s soul. This enables him to see what 
is overall in his interest, and would be the saviour of his 
life.  
Given the strong motivational internalism entailed by 
Socratic intellectualism, once Meno knows what will benefit 
him overall he will inevitably pursue it.64 As things seem to 
Meno on first appearances, submitting to the eristic 
argument looks to promise the comforts of instant 
acquiescence. There is, in this case, an example of “bias 
towards the near”, whereby pleasures closer at hand always 
                                                 
63 As Moss (2006), p.508, “on this characterization […] desires 
for pleasure are sensitive to, and often even arise out of, 
calculations about the relative sizes of pleasures and pains.” 
64 Bobonich (2010), p.313: “Since the art of measurement directs 
us to maximize our pleasure because that is best for us, we get the 
Principle of Rational Eudaimonism (Prt. 356a-357e). Indeed, 
since Socrates thinks that all desire is for the good, and 
understands this in a maximizing way, he is committed to a 
stronger form of PE– that is, to the claim that a person desires 
and pursues anything only insofar as it conduces to his own 
greatest happiness. Since this is what reason prescribes, Socrates 
is thus also committed to a stronger form of rational 
eudaimonism such that one’s (greatest happiness) is one’s only 
rational consideration in action.” 
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appear larger than those further away.65 Owing to this bias, 
the eristic argument appears to provide a greater good (or 
pleasure) to Meno than the alternative of a protracted 
inquiry, whose pleasures—if that inquiry were ever to result 
in discovery—would not be so close-by. However, with the 
use of the skill of measuring, Meno will no longer see the 
ready-comforts of the eristic argument as inflated, to-be-
pursued pleasures. If Meno was for one moment tempted66 
by the apparent pleasures on offer with the eristic 
argument, the effect of the measuring art on this 
appearance will be counteracted or canceled once the eristic 
argument’s proximal pleasures have been revealed as actual 
harms (not to mention, of course, being vastly outweighed 
by concrete benefits of putting his faith—as Socrates has 
(81e2)—in the doctrine of recollection). 
According to this reading, once Socrates spells out the 
consequences of submitting to the eristic argument, viz. its 
harmful effect on our character, it is purely a matter of 
prudential reasoning that leads Meno to reject it in favour 
of the doctrine of recollection, which promises, by contrast, 
myriad benefits. (These benefits include, we are told at 86b-
c3, making us “more manly” (ἀνδρικώτεροι). This will seem 
a particularly impressive benefit to Meno. As Ionescu 
observes, “Meno generally subscribes to common 
traditional views [...] and the superiority of manly over 
cooperative virtues is one of the common opinions that he 
endorses”.)67 Thus, once Meno can see his desire to submit 
                                                 
65 Warren (2014), p.112. 
66 In this passage, Meno is tempted to acquiesce to the eristic 
argument. This does not imply that Meno at any point risks 
acting akratically, or that any mental conflict is at work. That is, 
there is not, simultaneously, one part of Meno’s soul that wants 
to heed the eristic argument, and another that wants to resist. 
Meno either goes one way or the other. 
67 Ionescu (2007), p.5. 
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to the eristic argument as harmful, as a consequence of his 
latent commitment to PE (whereby desiring the harmful 
entails, per impossible, the desire to be wretched) he will no 
longer find the eristic argument desirable, for, ex hypothesi, 
he cannot desire a comparatively smaller pleasure over a 
greater one. By revealing the eristic argument to be harmful 
and the recollection doctrine to be beneficial, Socrates gives 
Meno all the information he needs to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis that will give him overall pleasure. The 
knowledge resulting from this cost-benefit analysis enables 
Meno to make a choice that could prove the saviour of his 
life.  
Unfortunately, we find this ‘Protagoras reading’ of 
Meno’s change of heart (or, to avoid any irrational 
contamination, mind) deeply implausible. As we know, 
Meno cannot but choose the gratification of oratory over 
the discomforts of reflective, norm-governed thought. 
Owing to this, Warren’s comments on the hedonic (and 
perhaps affective) disadvantages of the art of measurement 
seem particularly salient when we apply them to Meno: 
 
The calculation […] is itself likely to be of 
some hedonic cost in so far as it requires time 
and effort and, even if it is not itself a painful 
activity, precludes the performance of some 
other potentially more pleasant activity.68 
 
Furthermore, how could a character who has shown 
systematic obliviousness—if not disdain (76a8–c3)—
regarding the need to think for himself suddenly end up 
autonomously engaged in the art of measurement? This 
implausibility is made particularly conspicuous against the 
following remarks of Klein’s. As Klein notes, just as 
Meno’s answers are not “his answers”, neither are his 
                                                 
68 Warren (2014), p.116 n.21. 
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judgments his judgments, since “they merely reproduce the 
opinions of others”. 69  Likewise, “his questions are not 
really questions since they do not stem from the desire to 
know”.70 If Meno’s questions have “any background at all”, 
Klein continues, “it is provided either by Meno’s desire to 
avoid such exploration and search, or by his habit of 
bringing his memories into play”.71 While, then, engaging in 
the art of measurement is of course what Meno should do, 
not least because his patterns of forming beliefs aim at the 
pleasant without any reflective concern for the good (even 
though his pursuit of pleasure aims teleologically at the 
good), it is highly doubtful that Meno deploys the skill of 
measuring. Meno would of course be more prudentially 
rational if he did bother to conduct a truth-productive (Prt. 
356d8-e2) prudential calculus on his choices, particularly if 
he aims at pleasure as the apparent good. But Meno has 
eschewed the norms of belief-formation for far too long 
for this to be at all persuasive. Counterfactually, yes, the art of 
measurement would be the saviour of Meno’s life, were he to 
bother to engage in it. But he is so out of practice with utilising 
any such skill that it is implausible that he should be doing 
so on this occasion. 
But perhaps this is too quick. Perhaps, we could instead 
adopt a reading presented by Penner, which would not 
require us to make any implausible assumptions about 
Meno’s (dormant or otherwise) calculative skills.72  Penner 
proposes to explain why we act as we do according our 
perception of “different gestalts” of an action's value. 73 
                                                 
69 Klein (1965), p.188. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., pp.188-189. 
72 Penner (1996), pp.199-229. 
73 Ibid. 
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These gestalts of value appear and then disappear 
depending on perspective, such as when a pleasant object is 
closer or farther at hand. 74  Perceiving the differences 
between these different gestalts of value enables, as Warren 
notes, “correct estimation and comparison” by contrast 
with “with the simple acceptance of appearances”. 75  It 
would be Socrates who made these various gestalts apparent 
to Meno, and to that extent Socrates lends Meno a hand in 
measuring the various benefits of his choices at the juncture 
between submitting to the eristic argument and trusting 
instead in the recollection myth. This would render Meno’s 
choice to turn his back on the eristic argument a choice 
resulting from measurement, albeit one helped along by 
Socrates’ own calculated presentation of their respective 
benefits. Meno’s choice is, on this reading, mediated by 
Socrates’ appraisal of Meno’s options.76  
We think any decisive reading of Meno’s change of mind, 
however, ought to pay greater attention to the language 
Socrates uses in his attack on laziness (81d5-e2). Or, 
indeed, the fact that it is an attack of sorts. Let us return, 
then, to the “music to the ears of weaklings” passage: 
 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 Warren (2014), p.106. 
76 In this respect, Socrates acts as a kind of sophist, ensuring that 
things appear to Meno in the way Socrates intends. However, 
unlike the sophists’ deceptive words, Socrates’ logoi are soul-
bettering. Socrates may be a producer of appearances (Soph. 236a-
c), insofar as he attempts to present Meno’s options in a certain 
way (and to that extent, put Meno in mind of the truth). Quite 
unlike the sophist’s art, Socrates’ noble art is guided by the 
motive of unseating false beliefs, or very minimally beliefs that 
get in the way of doing philosophy.  
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We ought not then to be led astray by the 
contentious argument you quoted. It would 
make us lazy and is music to the ears of weaklings. 
The other doctrine produces energetic seekers 
after knowledge; and being convinced of its 
truth, I am ready, with your help, to inquire 
into the nature of virtue. (81d5-e2)    
 
This speech constitutes a forcible, though verbal, 77 
indictment on the source of Meno’s intellectual laziness. It 
is apt to make Meno feel acutely pained, and deeply 
ashamed—not least on account of being likened, albeit 
counterfactually, to somebody ‘soft-of-soul’, which is likely 
to disgust the champion of manly virtues that is Meno.78 
These pains range over something Meno thought worthy of 
pursuit, or rather, intellectual capitulation: the eristic 
argument (80d5-e5). This speech, we argue, is Socrates’ 
attempt to forge a connexion between an apparent good 
(the eristic argument, which appears good because it offers 
a lazy mind relief from the strains of inquiry), and the 
experience of pain, which Meno is likely to experience as a 
harm.  Our claim is that in this speech Socrates exploits 
Meno’s assumption that being pained (or, as Meno thinks 
                                                 
77  That words (logoi) can have the effect of physical force is 
strongly suggested by the pharmaceutical properties that certain 
logoi and muthoi possess (e.g Meno 80a3-4—recall in the Meno that 
Meno experiences elenctic aporia physically; Meno says Socrates 
bewitches him with “magic and spells” (γοητεύεις με καὶ 
φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις). As Murray (1996), p.229 
notes, this recalls the analogy between persuasion and cookery in 
the Gorgias 463-5. Moreover, as Moline (1978), p.17 observes, the 
goal of curing the soul of its vice “is attainable by verbal means—
by the use of words so remarkable in their effect that he terms 
them or "charms" and likens them to φάρμακα or drugs”. 
78 Ionescu (2007), p.5, p.12. 
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of it, harmed) brings about, or connotes, the poor condition 
of the soul and so wretchedness—an assumption embedded, as 
we saw in within a psychological eudaimonist framework 
(§I). Socrates exploits this assumed equivalence on Meno’s 
part, and, by making Meno feel pain with regard to 
something he thought was worthy of pursuit, Socrates causes 
Meno to think that the thing he thought worthy of pursuit 
cannot in fact be worthy of pursuit because, on account of 
bringing about a painful state of soul, it seems to Meno that 
it cannot thereby conduce to his happiness (ex hypothesi, 
PE). The positive evaluative belief that drew Meno towards 
the eristic argument, then, is given up because this is seen 
as disserving his PE: that which structures and regulates all 
of Meno’s desires. 79  And, given the co-instantiation of 
evaluative belief and desire, this all serves to eliminate 
Meno’s desire for the eristic argument.  
It is even, on a hydraulic reading of this passage, capable 
of forming a desire in an opposite direction of the eristic 
argument. Such hydraulic models are found in both 
Socratic and Platonic moral psychology. Take this instance 
from the Gorgias: 
                                                 
79 Socrates’ “music to the ears of weaklings” speech is intended to 
register in Meno as ad hominem. As such, it constitutes an attempt 
to curb Meno’s enthusiasm for the eristic argument. In so 
curbing, however, the attack on laziness effects its second 
purpose. By effectively ‘punishing’ the errant evaluative belief and 
desire that gave rise to the eristic argument—which bespeak 
Meno’s laziness—Socrates achieves what he describes as the 
moral psychological effect of rejecting the eristic argument in 
favour of the doctrine of recollection, viz. of making one 
energetic and manly (of which we are reminded at 86b-c3).  This 
passage (81d5-e2), therefore, not only describes a hydraulic effect 
of a certain kind of logos (one that should be resisted on similar 
grounds to tragic poetry, see Rep. 603c ff.); it achieves the hydraulic 
effect in its very utterance, since it is an attack on laziness that 
Meno will register as an attack on his laziness.   
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 But when it is a matter of leading men's 
desires into a different direction, not indulging 
them, [but] persuading and constraining them, 
that will make the citizens better. (Grg. 517b5- 
7. Our translation.)  
 
While, in Republic VI:  
 
Now, we surely know that, when someone’s 
desires incline strongly for one thing, they are 
thereby weakened for others, just like a stream 
that has been partly diverted into another 
channel. (Rep. VI 485d6-8) 
 
Thus, as Nicholas White nicely 
summarises: 
   
A 'hydraulic' conception of motivation 
[indicates that] the forces of all desires are 
roughly commensurable. Each part's desires 
exert pressure in some direction. The action 
that these desires produce depends on the 
direction in which the total pressure is 
greatest. One desire's gain in pressure is also 
another desire's loss. No further factor plays a 
role.80 
 
Given this characterisation of Socratic/Platonic 
psychology in the foregoing quotations, we can begin to 
offer an account of how such a hydraulic account of moral 
education can be read into the Meno’s “music to the ears of 
                                                 
80  Nicholas White, "Plato and the Ethics of Virtue" in The 
Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, edited by Lorraine Besser and 
Michael Slote (London: Routledge, 2015): p.10. 
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weaklings” speech. As we see it, since this speech channels 
Meno’s rational desires away from the now-impugned 
object of his desire/evaluative belief, Meno’s rational desire 
will take a new intentional object of an evaluatively 
opposed kind. Thus, the hydraulic effect at work here 
replaces Meno’s rational desire for the eristic argument 
(whereby inquiry is abandoned) with a rational desire for 
the recollection doctrine (whereby inquiry is rebooted).  
This reading of Meno’s change of mind is eminently 
more plausible than the ‘Protagoras reading’. This is because 
the psychological assumptions this reading requires us to 
make are entirely fitting with what we have seen from 
Meno’s character. As we know, Meno is a student of 
Gorgias, a sophist. Sophists succeed in the same ways that 
pastry-chefs do: persuading on account of pleasure (Grg. 
521a2-5, 521e2-4). They do this by flattering and 
confirming the evaluative beliefs of their customers, unable 
to contradict them (Grg. 481d6-e3), thereby bringing about 
the apparent good-condition of their customers’ souls 
(euexia). As Devereux notes:  
 
The rhetorician does not bring the many over 
to his view; rather, he ‘flatters’ them by telling 
them what they want to hear; what [the 
rhetorician] says is changeable and 
inconsistent, reflecting the shifting whims and 
desires of the many.81  
 
By chastising Meno’s intellectual laziness, and the 
evaluative beliefs that are the cognitive source of an 
impoverished way of life, Socrates forces Meno to give up 
these beliefs. On the best possible reading, these now-
impugned evaluative beliefs and their co-instantiated 
rational desires will be substituted for those that conduce to 
                                                 
81 Devereux (1995), p.395, n.26. 
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Meno’s wellbeing, viz. those constitutive of Meno qua 
psychological eudaimonist.  
               At this point it would be an oversight to pay 
no heed to the moral educational tool that is Socrates’ 
putative ‘demonstration’ of the doctrine of recollection 
with Meno’s slave. While we see the demonstration’s 
import, we believe it serves as a mere ex post facto 
restatement of the “music to the ears of weaklings” 
passage. However, and more positively, in recapitulating the 
conclusion about the possible objects of desire from 77b-
78b, the slave-boy demonstration serves to “tie down” 
(97d6–98a8) the results of the foregoing elenchus and 
protreptic. To this extent, the slave-boy demonstration 
does important moral educational work, even if it is 
essentially reiterative.  
The slave-boy demonstration helps Meno to actively 
and explicitly connect the apparent harm of aporia (84b7-8) 
with benefit (84c9). Moreover, the slave boy demonstration 
enables Meno to see the ensuing “longing” (ἐπόθησε 84b6-
7) for intellectual labour (sc. inquiry) that results from 
having forged this cognitive connexion (in the slave-boy 
himself). That is to say, the lesson Socrates makes explicit 
for Meno from the slave-boy’s chipper attitude to aporia, 
and his resulting success, is intended to ensure that Meno 
‘joins the dots’ between experiences of pain and their 
benefits. Meno should have learned this from the “music to 
the ears of weaklings” attack—perhaps this is of a piece 
with the Meno’s claim that learning comes about by 
repetition (85c10-d1). As Socrates notes of the slave-boy’s 
newly-recovered, but unstable opinions, 
 
If someone asks him these same things many 
times and in many ways, you can be sure that in 
the end he will come to have exact knowledge 
of these things as well as anyone else does. 
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Quite literally, then, the slave-boy demonstration is 
intended to supplement what has already been shown to 
benefit Meno during the “music to the ears of weaklings” 
speech. As such, the slave-boy demonstration is just 
another one of “many ways” (85c11) to fasten down 
Meno’s moral psychological improvement.  
All of this should remind us of the discussion at 77b-
78b, and its central thesis of PE. Just as if something 
thought to be good can be shown to harm, this—from the 
perspective of the subject—invalidates the apparent 
equivalence of these states, and as a result eliminates the 
rational desire caused by thinking something to be good. 
Likewise, if a pain can be shown to benefit, this also—from 
the perspective of the subject—repudiates the subjective 
assumption that pains are wretchedness-conducing, and 
indeed produces—as is no less than exemplified in the slave 
boy—a desire for the thing now cognised as beneficial, as a 
corollary of PE.  
We have called the slave boy demonstration an ‘ex post 
facto restatement’ because it really does no new work than 
the “music to the ears of weaklings” speech. It rather does 
the same work in another way. That attack caused Meno to 
passively connect the object with putative positive valence 
(sc. Meno’s attraction to the eristic argument) to the 
experience of pain, thereby replacing positive valence with 
negative. Likewise with the slave boy demonstration, this 
“object lesson”, 82  as Scott calls it, intends to show an 
apparent harm (viz. a painful experience) to in fact be a 
benefit, and because of this, the formerly-assumed harm 
now recognised as a benefit will appear to Meno to serve his 
standing eudaimonist interests, owing to the equivalence 
between the beneficial and the happiness-conducing. He 
will, owing to the thesis of PE, rationally desire the object 
he now perceives as beneficial to him. This suffices for 
                                                 
82 Scott (2005), p.170. 
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Meno to recollect a desire to know: a desire constitutive of 
him, and all of us, as psychological eudaimonists.  
 
 
EPILOGUE 
 
So what does this hydraulic account of Meno’s moral 
education mean for his capacity for practical reasoning 
going forward? On our account, to the extent that the “true 
self”83 in Plato is practical reason (in the strong, Kantian 
sense), the hydraulic unseating of errant desires makes the 
descriptive ‘norms’ of the true self’s practical rationality 
hegemonic (that is, able to rule) once again. In Meno’s case 
this is perhaps the first time that reason has been made 
practical. Thus, the norms of practical rationality are 
realised and accessed without error once bad desires have 
been hydraulically unseated. On our reading of this 
dialogue, then, PE can only function as a descriptive norm 
of agency once errant desires have been unseated. And the 
hydraulic mechanism of their unseating is especially 
propitious for candidates with tyrannical souls, in whom 
pleasures of various kakodaimonic kinds connote the good. 
Thus, according to our reading of the Meno, moral 
education consists in recovering by recognising the desires 
and evaluative beliefs that constitute us as psychological 
eudaimonists. We cannot endorse any desires that, upon 
sufficient reflection, propel us towards misery and 
wretchedness (78a-b). Since we are—as Meno is—readily 
taken in by the apparent good-condition of the soul 
brought about by pleasure, we just as readily assume that 
pain connotes harm, which we avoid – consistently with 
our eudaimonism and rational desire – as a negative 
corollary of acting for the sake of the good. As such, 
Socrates in his “music to the ears of weaklings” speech 
                                                 
83 On this notion, see especially Cornford (1933, p.306). 
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begins Meno’s progress by exploiting Meno’s first-order 
desire to avoid pain, perceived by Meno as an apparent 
harm, in order to drive him away from the temptations of 
the eristic argument. Indeed, to pursue something so apt to 
harm is psychologically excluded on the eudaimonist 
picture. Then, to “tie down” Meno’s progress and to ensure 
it does not run away like the statues of Daedalus (97d6-10), 
through the slave boy demonstration Socrates engenders 
explicitly, not least to Meno’s acceptance (84b9, 84c10), the 
benefits that belie apparent harms. Altogether, this mints in 
Meno a new, or rather recollected, desire for inquiry, whereby 
the “background” 84  for his questions is no longer an 
empirical disposition of intellectual torpor, but his 
recovered standing desire to learn. i 
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